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Abstract 
We exploit historical differences in foral law to consistently estimate the contribution of the 
quality of enforcement institutions to economic specialization across Spanish provinces in  
the period 1999-2014. The distribution of economic activity in Spain as of today shows a 
strong pattern of geographical specialization. Regions less specialized in manufacturing 
(industry) and oriented to services sectors (Andalusia, Extremadura) in the south are compared 
with industrialized/manufacturing regions in the north such as the Basque Country, Navarre 
or Aragon. We construct province-level congestion rates across three different jurisdictions 
(civil, labor and administrative) from real judicial data measuring the performance of the 
Spanish judicial system over time, and estimate the effect of judicial efficacy on the share of 
manufacturing and services in the total output. Using a variety of estimation techniques, the 
evidence unveils strong and persistent effects of judicial efficacy on province-level economic 
specialization with notable distributional differences. The provinces with a historical experience 
of foral law are significantly more likely to have more efficient enforcement institutions at the 
present day. In turn, greater judicial efficacy facilitates specialization in high-productivity 
manufacturing while greater judicial inefficacy encourages service-intensive specialization. The 
effect of judicial efficacy on economic specialization does not depend on confounders, holds 
across a number of specification checks and appears to be causal. Lastly, the three 
jurisdictions seem relevant to explain specialization, although the administrative jurisdiction 
appears to have a more pronounced impact than the labor or civil jurisdictions. 
Keywords: economic specialization, institutions, justice. 
JEL Classification: O1, K4. 
 
 
  
  
Resumen 
Este documento estima el efecto de la calidad de las instituciones en el patrón de 
especialización productiva observado en España en el período 1999-2014 a nivel local. La 
investigación parte de la observación de que la actividad económica en España muestra un 
fuerte patrón de especialización geográfica: las regiones menos especializadas en 
manufacturas o actividades industriales y orientadas al sector servicios en el sur (como 
Andalucía o Extremadura) contrastan con regiones más industrializadas o con mayor 
intensidad manufacturera en el norte, como el País Vasco, Navarra o Aragón. Para realizar el 
análisis, construimos tasas de congestión judicial a nivel provincial para las jurisdicciones civil, 
administrativa y social y estimamos su efecto sobre el peso del sector manufacturero y el 
sector servicios en el PIB provincial. Para que la estimación sea consistente, analizamos las 
diferencias históricas en la vigencia de Derecho foral o especial y las relacionamos con la 
eficacia del sistema judicial hoy. Tras utilizar diversas técnicas de estimación, los resultados 
muestran un efecto fuerte y persistente de la eficacia judicial sobre la especialización 
productiva a nivel provincial. Más en concreto, las provincias en las que históricamente ha 
habido vigencia de Derecho foral o especial tienen una probabilidad significativamente mayor 
de que la eficacia judicial sea más alta hoy. A su vez, una mayor eficacia judicial facilita la 
especialización de la provincia en actividades manufactureras de alta productividad y una 
menor eficacia fomenta la especialización en el sector servicios. El efecto de la eficacia 
judicial sobre la especialización productiva parece robusto en distintas verificaciones y 
parece ser causal. Por último, las tres jurisdicciones serían relevantes para explicar la 
especialización, si bien parece tener un impacto más pronunciado la jurisdicción administrativa 
que la laboral o la civil. 
Palabras clave: especialización productiva, instituciones, justicia. 
Códigos JEL: O1, K4. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Enforcement Institutions and Specialization 
Enforcement institutions, of which the most representative example is the judicial system, are an 
integral part of the institutional matrix. Proper enforcement of contracts and property rights may 
need a well-functioning set of enforcement institutions [North (1990), Coase (1960), Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2005)]. More specifically, economic efficiency is related, on the one hand, to the 
quality of enforcement institutions that “control” the contracts between private agents (citizens 
and companies), and, on the other hand, to the quality of enforcement of property rights, which 
defend citizens and companies from potential expropriation from the government. There are 
numerous studies that relate the efficacy of enforcement institutions with greater efficiency either 
at specific sectors (such as the performance of the credit markets1) or at the international level 
(see Palumbo et al. 2013 for a survey). For the specific case of Spain there is evidence confirming 
the impact of the quality of enforcement on several aspects such as credit market development 
(Mora-Sanguinetti et al. 2017), firm creation (through firm entry and exit rates) (García-Posada and 
Mora-Sanguinetti, 2014) or firm size (García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2015). Related to 
those questions, see also Fabbri (2010). 
Far from general analyzes, a question that has not been widely studied is whether the 
lack of efficacy of enforcement institutions has an effect on sectoral specialization. The study 
of sectoral specialization is important because, according to the literature, economic 
development and "industrial mix" may be related. That is, different economies may experience 
different long-run economic outcomes partially because of their sectoral specialization patterns. 
This would be consistent with the neoclassical trade theory (Slaughter, 1997, Rassek and 
Thompson, 1998, Martínez-Galarraga et al. 2015).  
The reasoning behind this research question is that sectors should not be reacting the 
same to the efficacy of the judicial system. A starting observation indicates that sectors within 
an economy differ markedly in their dependence on complex (and long-term, i.e require long-
term relationships between different companies) investment decisions. The problem is that 
those decisions are normally irreversible and, if they are affected by a certain degree of 
specificity, they can be subject to holdup problems (Klein et al., 1978, Levchenko, 2007) and 
opportunism. Even if a "complete" contract could be designed2, there would always be risks 
of non-compliance. Because of this, investment needs mechanisms to ensure enforcement 
and in this way, agents can achieve a perception of security in the process. The paradigmatic 
example of these mechanisms in a developed economy is the judicial system. Indeed, 
international evidence indicates that before an inefficient institutional framework there could be 
less investment (Nunn, 2007).  
Therefore, ineffective enforcement institutions should affect to a greater extent sectors 
that are more dependent on investment decisions and the impact should be greater the more 
complex and dependent on interaction with other agents these investments are. Following this 
same reasoning, we can go a step further and differentiate between investment decisions in 
tangible versus intangible (or “knowledge-based” capital)3. Following the OECD (2015), there is 
                                                                          
1 Djankov et al. (2008), Bae and Goyal (2009), Qian and Strahan (2007), Jappelli et al. (2005) and Shvets (2013). 
2 A strategy to "complete" the contract could be giving the "property rights" of each aspect not specifically 
contracted to only one of the contracting parties (Grossman and Hart, 1986). 
3 See OECD (2017) or Corrado et al. (2009) for a list of assets which could be considered “knowledge-based”.  
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international evidence4 showing that the median knowledge capital intensity in 2013 was above 
in manufacturing with respect to any other sector (ranging from agriculture to “other services”), 
with the only exception of trade and finance. Also, according to the OECD (2017), new-to-
market product innovators (as a % of all business in each sector) were higher in Spain in the 
manufacturing industries than in the services industries (this pattern is also commonly observed 
in other economies). A judicial system that works with average performance may be sufficient 
to protect physical capital (as its measurement is quite straightforward) while the protection of 
the company’s intangible assets (copyrights, patents, etc.) is more difficult (Kumar et al. 2001, 
García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2014) and may need a high-performing judicial system. 
In the last paragraphs, it was argued that the judicial system may affect investment through 
its impacts on private contracts. However, the potential expropriation by politicians and elites may 
also generate uncertainty. A company could seek protection from the judicial system also against 
this risk. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) related an ineffective defense of property rights with lower 
economic development in the long term and lower investment and financial development. 
As an overall prediction, economies with greater judicial efficacy should specialize 
intensively in sectors more dependent on specific investments such as manufacturing. In 
contrast, economies with a lower degree of judicial efficacy should specialize in low-skilled 
services.  
1.2 Geographical Specialization, Economic Development and Institutions in Spain 
Economic activity in Spain shows a strong pattern of geographical specialization. Regions least 
specialized in manufacturing (industry) and oriented to services sectors (Andalusia, 
Extremadura) in the South are confronted to highly industrialized/manufacturing regions in the 
North such as the Basque Country, Navarre or Aragon.  
At the same time, we observe that there are still today considerable differences in 
economic development between different regions in Spain. Following the statistics of the 
National Statistics Institute (INE) (Spanish Regional Accounts), GDP per capita was more than 
25% higher in Madrid, the Basque Country or Navarre compared to the national average in 
2014. By contrast, GDP per capita in Extremadura or Andalusia was more than 25% lower 
than the national average. These differences seem to be persistent in the long run, with a trend 
that may have existed since 1800 (Carreras, 1990), although including a period of convergence 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Goerlich Gisbert and Mas Ivars, 2002, Tortosa-Ausina et al. 2005). To 
date, and despite the mentioned period of convergence, we could clearly observe a spatial 
clustering, bringing together the richest provinces in the northeast of the country and the poor 
in the southwest (Tirado-Fabregat et al. 2015) (see Figure 1).  
  
                                                                          
4 The OECD (2015) shows aggregate international data at the sector level for a group of selected economies 
(including Spain and another EU 13 countries).  
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Figure 1: GDP per Capita (Euros) at the Spanish Provinces (2014) 
 
SOURCE: self-elaboration from INE (2016) Regional Accounts. Pro 
memoria: GDP per capita of Spain (2014): 22323 euros. 
As it was discussed above, development and sectoral specialization may be linked. 
Thus, convergence in sectoral patterns between regions may reduce inequality. Indeed, 
convergence in sectoral organization of regional economies would mainly explain the 
convergence mentioned in the 60s and the 70s at the regional level in Spain. This does not 
exclude other explanations, such as the reduction in productivity gaps “within” sectors. The 
lack of further convergence at the industrial/sectoral mix would partially explain the lack of 
further reduction in inequalities between Spanish regions in the last part of the last century, 
although the importance of productivity performance intra-sector is gaining weight. The debate 
may be also connected with other recent discussions in the literature. In fact, the Spanish case 
could go hand in hand with the hypothesis of Rodrik (2016), who suggested that a “premature 
deindustrialization” might be taking place in several countries. The rise of construction in Spain 
before the recession, accompanied by the decline of growth-enhancing manufacturing and by 
the rise in low-skilled services may follow the pattern suggested by Rodrik.5 On these issues, 
the literature repeats that more empirical work is needed (De la Fuente, 2002, Martínez-
Galarraga et al, 2015). In Figure 2, we present the spatial distribution of manufacturing activity 
and services across Spanish provinces in the period 1999-2014 where a clear North-South 
gradient is also apparent. 
  
                                                                          
5 In more general terms, Rodrik (2016) proposed a suggestive example: imagine a country with a high-income 
industrialized region and two other regions, characterized by low-income (one of them characterized by a 
comparative advantage in manufacturing). As a result of the implementation of labor-saving technologies and a 
reduction in transport or transaction costs among regions, the low-income region without comparative advantage 
in manufacturing would suffer a reduction in output (and employment). 
14957‐17287
17357‐18625
18755‐20509
20732‐24872
25250‐34054
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Figure 2: Spatial Distribution of Manufacturing and Services across Spanish Provinces 
 
(a) Manufacturing/GDP Ratio (b) Services/GDP Ratio 
  
 
The article analyzes the institutional structure at the provincial level (NUTS6 3 data) and argues 
that specialization may be partially the outcome of the performance of the efficacy of 
enforcement institutions in the long run.  
1.3 Mechanisms 
The main testable prediction of this paper is that Spanish provinces with greater judicial efficacy 
should specialize intensively in sectors more dependent on specific investments such as 
manufacturing, and provinces with a lower degree of judicial efficacy should specialize in low-
skilled or non-complex activities, such as services and construction (see Section 1.1 and its 
references).  
In order to analyze the research question, we have constructed a novel database with 
real data on the performance of the Spanish judicial system. More specifically, we construct 
measures of efficacy for three different jurisdictions (administrative, civil and labor) at the 
province level (see Section 2.2 for more details of the “legal” structure of the Spanish judicial 
system). We expect to find that the efficacy in any of the three jurisdictions will have positive 
impacts on specialization in manufacturing (or “complex” economic activities). However, the 
analysis of the three jurisdictions will allow us to explore if the channel of expropriation risks is 
more important than the channel of (private) contractual risks as implied by Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005). 
More specifically, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) argued that countries with greater 
restrictions on their politicians and elites and greater protection against expropriation on their 
part would have higher investment rates. Moreover, at the country level, once controlled by 
institutions that defend property rights, the quality of "contractual" institutions (contracts 
between private agents) would have no effect on the investment to GDP ratio. It could be 
argued, therefore, that the jurisdiction of the judicial system that controls the administration 
might be more important for investment than the jurisdictions of the judicial system that controls 
the execution of private contracts. 
                                                                          
6  Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. 
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Indeed, the three jurisdictions in Spain deal with different types of conflicts. The 
administrative jurisdiction controls the functioning of the public administration (solving eminent 
domains related conflicts, zoning, public contracts, etc.) and could be considered as a proxy 
of the quality of the check and balances existing in the Spanish economy to control the power 
of the government. The civil jurisdiction deals with the enforcement of contracts between 
private companies and citizens and the labor jurisdiction deals with conflicts arising between 
employers and employees. The efficacy of these two jurisdictions (civil and labor) can be 
deemed as proxies to the quality of contracting institutions. Following the above mentioned 
reasoning, the administrative jurisdiction should have deeper effects on investment and 
specialization than the civil or the labor one.  
It should be noted that the analysis of the three jurisdictions gives depth to the study 
as it allows to consider in the same paper different potential links between the judicial system 
and the daily functioning of enterprises in any sector (see section 2.2): beyond the importance 
of judicial efficacy for investment (that would be a general concern), a company may be also 
negatively affected in its hiring decisions if the labor jurisdiction works inefficiently. Furthermore, 
companies more dependent on public contracting with the local, regional or state 
administrations may be more affected by the efficacy of the administrative jurisdictions (in 
contrast to other firms that interact eminently with other private enterprises and would be more 
dependent on the functioning of the civil jurisdiction).  
In order to analyze the impacts of judicial efficacy (through three different jurisdictions) 
on specialization, we build the shares of manufacturing and services in the total output at the 
province level. We then estimate the effect of the institutional framework on the share of 
manufacturing and services in the total output using a variety of estimation techniques: quantile 
regressions first and then an instrumental variables framework, exploiting as instruments certain 
historical conditions. A limitation of our analysis (that goes beyond this paper) is that 
specialization is measured in an aggregate way at the provincial level (as shares in the total 
output) and not at the enterprise level. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our dataset and 
discusses how we have constructed our measures of quality of the Spanish institutional setup 
and our instruments. Section 3 explains our identification strategy. Section 4 presents the 
results of the estimations and finally, Section 5 provides some conclusions. The paper is 
completed by three appendices: in the first one (A) we include (and discuss) a group of extra 
instruments related to the historical conditions of legal education in Spain, in the second one 
(B), we present a counterfactual scenario by province and jurisdiction, and in the third one (C) 
we present the impact of judicial efficacy on economic specialization using alternative outcome 
variables (taking into account agriculture and construction). 
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2 Data 
2.1 Outcomes 
We compute the share of manufacturing (M) and services (S) in the total output at the local 
level in the i-th province or the j-th autonomous community at time (t) as the two key measures 
of economic specialization. Following the standard classification of economic activity, the total 
output is divided into four sectors: (i) agriculture, (ii) manufacturing, (iii) construction, and (iv) 
services. Local shares of manufacturing and services in the total output exhibit substantial 
province-level variation. At one extreme, the province of Barcelona has a mean share of 
manufacturing in total output at 18%, and 74% share of services. At the other end, Málaga has 
a mean share of manufacturing in total output at 4% and 85% share of services. 
2.2 Measuring Judicial Efficacy 
We have constructed a database on the performance of “enforcement institutions” using actual 
operating data of the Spanish judicial system. The data is coming from the General Council of 
the Judiciary (CGPJ) of Spain. We can compile information on the conflicts resolved at the 
province level, by jurisdiction on a yearly basis. More specifically, the information on flows of 
new, pending and solved conflicts inside the system allows us to construct proxies for judicial 
efficacy at the province7 level.  
We have obtained data for three jurisdictions, more specifically those mainly related 
to the economic activity of enterprises and citizens: the administrative, labor and civil 
jurisdictions. Figure 3 provides a scheme of the Spanish judicial system. First, a company may 
have to negotiate with the public administrations in its daily activities. Several domains are 
affected by that type of interactions: ranging from the payment of taxes to obtaining zoning 
permits to construct an industrial warehouse. Conflicts arising from the contact between 
citizens or companies and the public administration will be usually solved by the jurisdiction for 
suits under administrative Law (or administrative jurisdiction). In parallel, a company may have 
conflicts with its employees. For instance, a dismissal conflict which arrives to the judicial 
system will be resolved by the labor jurisdiction.8 Finally, on a daily basis a company may have 
conflicts with other private firms or citizens such as suppliers and customers: for instance 
misinterpretations of private contracts (loans, intellectual property, etc), management of the 
dissatisfaction with the quality of a product or the problems in the reception of intermediate 
goods. All those conflicts will be solved by the civil (“private”) jurisdiction.  
Each jurisdiction is ruled by its own procedural rules, and its own courts (served by, 
to a certain extent, “specialized” judges). As it was discussed, our database compiles 
information on all those jurisdictions at the province level. Several approaches could be taken 
to proxy the efficacy of the judicial system. We have constructed a standard measure of 
enforcement efficacy called the "congestion" rate [see, among others, García-Posada and 
Mora-Sanguinetti (2015) or Ponticelli and Alencar (2016)]. The congestion rate is defined as the 
ratio of the sum of pending cases (measured at the beginning of the year, “t”), plus the new 
cases measured in a specific year divided by the resolved cases in the same year. A lower 
                                                                          
7 In the CGPJ data, the province of Cádiz includes the Autonomous city of Ceuta and Málaga includes the 
Autonomous city of Melilla in the 3 jurisdictions analyzed (administrative, labor and civil).  
8 The data we use correspond to the activity of labor judges. 
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congestion rate is related to a greater efficacy in the specific jurisdiction analyzed 
(administrative, labor and civil) in the province “j”. 
tj
tjtj
tj resolvedCases
casesNewcasesPending
rateCongestion
,
,1,
,
   
The descriptive statistics of the congestion rates obtained are presented in Table 1. In 
the case of the civil jurisdiction we have computed a congestion rate with data from 2002 (until 
2014). The reason to begin the analysis in 2002 is that a new Civil Procedural Law (CPL) entered 
into force on 7 January 2001, abrogating, after more than a century in force, the “old” CPL of 
1881. The new CPL changed several aspects of civil procedure in Spain making the system 
less “formal” (in the sense of Djankov et al. 2003) than before (Mora-Sanguinetti 2010). The 
types of procedures available for the parties were also new after 2001. More specifically, we 
have computed the congestion rate for a “representative” procedure (the “ordinary judgment” 
at the declaratory stage) including the scarce number of family Law cases taking the form of 
“ordinary” judgments.9 Then, in the case of the administrative and labor jurisdiction, we have 
data between 1999 and 2014. 
In Figure 4, we present the spatial distribution of the congestion rates using the first 
principal component of congestion rates across administrative, labor and civil jurisdictions. For 
the administrative and labor jurisdiction, we use 1999-2014 period while 2002-2014 period is 
used for the civil jurisdiction to compute the principal component. The evidence at first glance 
indicates a clear pattern between foral (see section 2.3.) and non-foral law provinces where the 
latter tend to have higher component scores, indicating greater congestion rates than the foral 
law provinces with p-value = 0.000 using a two-tailed mean comparison test. 
                                                                          
9 The “ordinary” judgments not including family cases encompasses conflicts arriving to the “first instance” and “first 
instance + instruction” courts. The ordinary judgments related to family Law encompasses conflicts arriving to the 
“first instance”, “first instance + instruction” and “family first instance” courts. 
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Figure 3: Simplified scheme of the Spanish judicial system 
 
SOURCE: Own elaboration. 
Figure 4: Judicial Inefficacy across Spanish Provinces 
 
 
SOURCE: Own elaboration. 
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2.3  Instrumental Variables: Foral Law 
As instruments we analyze if there is “foral Law” enforced in the province (i.e. “historical” 
civil/private Law regulations which differed from the “common” Spanish regulations since the 
middle ages, and are still applicable today with preference to the “common” ones in some 
specific provinces or regions). 10 
More specifically, the basic set of rules of private (civil) law in Spain is compiled in the 
"Civil Code" where we can find dispositions ranging from family law to general contract and 
property law. The Spanish “Civil Code” was enacted in 1889 and, even though it was a national 
Law, it recognized the enforceability of some private rules applicable in certain provinces by 
that time. That is, the “Civil Code” did not abrogate them. Those private rules are called “foral 
Law” or “special Law”. The Spanish Civil Code became thus supplementary of the “foral Law” 
in the provinces where it existed. Therefore, some private transactions are affected by private 
Law dispositions which may slightly differ from one Spanish province to another.  
If we take as a reference the compilation of foral Laws published by the BOE (Boletín 
Oficial del Estado, the State Official Newsletter) of 24th July 2017, there is still foral Law being 
enforced in the following provinces: Huesca, Zaragoza, Teruel, Balearic Islands, Barcelona, 
Tarragona, Lleida, Girona, A Coruña, Lugo, Ourense, Pontevedra, Navarra, Álava, Guipuzcoa, 
Vizcaya, Castellón, Valencia and Alicante. This coincides with the regions of Aragón, Catalonia, 
Balearic Islands, Valencia, Galicia, Navarra and the Basque Country. We have thus not included 
Badajoz (in Extremadura) and Ceuta.   
Based on that information, we have constructed a variable which captures the 
provinces in which a “foral” Law partially affects or substitutes part of the common (Spanish) 
civil Law. Thus, the variable takes value 1 in all the provinces mentioned above (see Figure 7) 
and it is called “Foral Law” in Table 5. However, we cannot sustain that “foral” Law is equally 
affecting the civil law of all the provinces captured by that variable. In order to construct a 
variable measuring the “weight” (or the “importance”) of foral Law, we have relied again in the 
compilation mentioned above. It contains a certain amount of norms by region (see Table 2a, 
Table 2b). From this information we have constructed two variables: “# Foral Legal norms” (as 
the number of norms included in the compilation by region/province) and “Foral Law per capita 
word count” which counts an approximated number of words of those norms. Following this 
count, the provinces of Catalonia are the most affected by foral Civil Law.  
So far, we have discussed the foral/special Law in the context of civil law which implies 
that the foral Law IVs will be used as IVs in the civil jurisdiction only. Nevertheless, there is 
foral/special law outside the civil jurisdiction. i.e. there is “foral Law” affecting the tax law in the 
Basque provinces, Navarra and the Canary Islands.11 This implies that the variable “Foral Law” 
takes value 1 only for the provinces in the Basque Country, Navarra and Canary Islands (as 
there are specific tax regulations in those provinces) when analyzing the administrative 
jurisdiction. As before, we construct the number of norms of this type taking into account the 
information included in a BOE compilation (Código de Legislación Tributaria). We also compute 
the “weight” of the norms, taking as a proxy the word count. Table 2a summarizes the 
foral/special law in the administrative jurisdiction. Table 2b exhibits the equivalent summary for 
                                                                          
10 As it will be discussed, we also mention the Tax Law specialties of the Basque Country and Navarra. 
11 We recognize that the term “foral” in this context is usually applied just to the Basque Country and Navarre. We  
 have decided not to extend  this terminological discussion as it is not probably a fundamental discussion for our  
 analysis.  
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the civil jurisdiction. Finally, it should be clarified that there is no “foral labor Law” (therefore, no 
“foral Law” IV will be included when we analyze that jurisdiction).  
As a robustness exercise, Appendix A adds a second group of IVs which compiles 
information on the historical conditions and structure of the Spanish university system.  
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2.4 Covariates 
2.4.1 TIME-VARYING COVARIATES 
Control variables capture systematic covariates related to the specialization profiles. Real GDP 
per capita controls for the general economic performance of the province in a specific point in 
time. Economic performance may be related to litigation levels (Ginsburg and Hoetker, 2006, 
Palumbo et al. 2013). Our period of analysis covers both years of expansion (before 2008) and 
recession (from 2008). We also control for the number of corporations per capita, constructed 
using data from the DIRCE (Central Business Register) of the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
As it is discussed in the literature, more “complex” local economic environments may induce 
higher litigation rates (Mora-Sanguinetti and Garoupa, 2015). Finally, we have also controlled 
by the number of lawyers (ejercientes) per capita in the province. 
2.4.2 TIME-INVARIANT COVARIATES 
2.4.2.1 Weather Conditions 
There may be a relationship between weather conditions and both litigation and economic 
specialization. Climate and temperature are ideal candidates to establish an exogenous source 
of variation in economic specialization (Gallup et al. 1999). Climate, for instance, has a bearing 
on agricultural productivity. Then, on the side of the enforcement institutions, following the 
literature (see Palumbo et al. 2013), the higher the weight of the agricultural sector with respect 
to industry, the higher the litigation. This may reflect, for instance, the  higher dependence on 
climatic conditions. From Carreras de Odriozola and Tafunell Sambola (2006), we have 
obtained historical data (since late XIX century) for weather conditions, specifically the quantities 
of rain (annual rainfall precipitation in mm and the volatility in annual rainfall precipitation) and 
the historical temperatures for the available provinces (mean temperature level and long-run 
temperature volatility). See Table 1 for the descriptive statistics. Figure 5 plots the mean annual 
temperature and precipitation against the log manufacturing/GDP ratio, and shows that the 
provinces with higher annual temperature show lower shares of industry in total output. On the 
other hand, provinces with greater precipitation tend to experience markedly higher share of 
industry in total output. 
Figure 5: Weather Conditions and Economic Specialization 
(a) Mean Annual Rainfall (b) Mean Annual Temperature 
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2.4.2.2 Historical Literacy Rates 
The role of human capital on specialization has been widely explored in the literature (Rosen, 
1983, Costinot, 2009). Historical rates of literacy may explain contemporary outcomes as 
traditionally less literate provinces should experience a greater absence of legal capital and 
knowledge. Using the same source as the previous case (Carreras de Odriozola and Tafunell 
Sambola, 2006), we have obtained historical data on literacy (from the census databases) in 
the years 1860, 1900, 1930, 1950 and 1960. Figure 6 plots the historical literacy rate from 
1860 against the current share of industry in total output, and suggests that the provinces with 
greater historical literacy tend to have substantially higher share of manufacturing in total 
output.  
Figure 6: Historical Literacy and Economic 
Specialization 
Figure 7: Provinces affected by Foral  
Civil Law 
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3 Identification Strategy 
3.1 Fixed-Effects Framework 
Our goal is to examine the contribution of judicial efficacy to the province-level economic 
specialization. As the two key measures of economic specialization, our outcome set 
comprises the share of manufacturing and share of services in total output. Ignoring non-
linearities, the basic fixed-effects relationships between judicial efficacy and economic 
specialization are: 
     
, , 1 , , , ,
, ,
1 1 1
ˆ
1 0,1 1 0,1 1 0,1
i j t i j t TV TI
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' '
i iX X
 (3.2) 
where M  denotes the share of manufacturing in i-th province within j-th autonomous 
community12 at time t, and S  denotes the share of services. The key covariate of interest is 
CR  which denotes the jurisdiction-level congestion rate. 1ˆ  and 2ˆ  capture the 
contribution of jurisdiction-level judicial efficacy to the economic specialization. The set of 
covariates ,TV
'
iX  is the vector of province-level time-varying control variables while ,TI
'
iX  
denotes the vector of time-invariant province-level covariates such as historical literacy rates 
and geography covariates. The term  1 0,1i i      captures the unobserved province-
level heterogeneity bias shifting the intercept  ,  1 0,1j    denotes the autonomous 
community unobserved effects, and  1 0,1t    denotes the time-varying technology 
shocks common across all provinces. The terms , ,i j tu  and , ,i j t  capture the stochastic 
disturbances. The key challenge posited by the linear fixed-effects relationship in (3.1) and (3.2) 
concern the province-level uncertainty of the standard errors which critically affects the 
consistency of the estimated judicial efficacy parameters. A major threat to the proposed 
empirical strategy is the possibility of serially correlated stochastic disturbances both across 
and within provinces for the given size of 1,2,...t T . The failure to control for temporal and 
spatial clustering of stochastic disturbances can lead to massively underestimated standard 
errors, which implies that the set of null hypotheses on the effects of congestion rate on the 
economic specialization is over-rejected using standard hypothesis tests (Moulton 1986, 1990). 
In repeated cross sections such as our province-year panel, spatial and temporal clustering of 
the observables and unobservables can persist even when potentially unobserved effects are 
controlled for. Valid standard errors require overcoming the single-way clustering using the 
                                                                          
12 Spain is a very much decentralized country. It is divided in 17 regions (Autonomous Communities) which have 
legislative powers and 50 provinces (each region is composed by 1 or more provinces). There are also 2 
Autonomous cities in the North of Africa (Ceuta and Melilla) which do not belong to any province or region. 
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multi-way clustering scheme to control for within-province serial correlation of unobservables 
(Kezdi 2004, Bertrand et. al. 2004).  
We use a non-nested multiway clustering estimator from Cameron et al. (2011), and 
cluster the standard errors at the province-, region (autonomous community)- and year-level 
based on two-way error components model with i.i.d. error distribution assumption similar to 
Moulton (1986), Pepper (2002) and Davis (2002), compared to one-way clustering [White 
(1980), Pfefferman and Nathan (1981), Liang and Zeger (1986), Arellano (1987), Hansen (2007), 
Wooldridge (2003), Cameron and Trivedi (2005)] which may lead to the over-rejection of the 
null hypotheses and render the standard errors and parameter inference unreliable. This 
strategy allows us to estimate the model parameters in (3.1) and (3.2) consistently by allowing 
for heteroskedastic distribution of the random error variance and serial correlation in 
observables both across and within provinces. 
3.2  Quantile Regression Framework 
Although the fixed-effects estimation setup may yield consistent parameter estimates, a 
potential backdrop against uncovering the full effect of judicial efficacy on economic 
specialization can arise from neglecting the parameter estimates across various tails of the 
distribution. Our outcome variables have a continuous distribution, which can change in a way 
not revealed by the average effect of judicial efficacy. In spatial and temporal terms, the 
distribution of service and manufacturing shares can either spread out or become more 
compressed. In order to better grasp the effects of judicial efficacy on economic specialization, 
understanding the entire distribution is necessary. We replicate the fixed-effects relationship 
from (3.1) and (3.2) across various tails of the outcomes’ distribution using the quantile 
regression estimator of the following form: 
  1, , , , , , , ,ˆM i j t TV TIQ CR           ' 'i iX X          (3.3) 
  2, , , , , , , ,ˆS i j t TV TIQ CR           ' 'i iX X          (3.4) 
where  MQ   and  SQ   denote the τ-th quantile regression function for each outcome. 
Both functions solve the minimization problem weighing the positive and negative terms 
asymmetrically across τ quantiles: 
       
  , ,1 1 1 , ,
ˆ arg min arg min 1
i i
N J T
M
i j t M i i
q qi j t M j t M j t q
q M q q M M q         
            
 (3.5) 
       
  , ,1 1 1 , ,
ˆ arg min arg min 1
i i
N J T
S
i j t M i i
q qi j t S j t S j t q
q S q q S S q         
            
 (3.6) 
where ρ is the check function that determines the relative size of the quantile. Substituting the 
linear fixed-effects model for the conditional quantile function, we allow the underlying effect of 
judicial congestion rate to vary across quantiles using the asymmetric loss function in the 
following form: 
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k
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i iX X        (3.8) 
which allows to unravel the full distributional effect of judicial efficacy on economic 
specialization. We set ρ =.001 so that the underlying check function is based on the micro-
percentile simulation of the overall effect of the judicial efficacy to avoid the compression of 
substantial parts of the full distribution that may be not be best characterized by the conditional 
mean independence assumption used in the fixed-effects estimation framework. 
3.3  Instrumental Variables Setup 
The main drawback of the fixed-effects and quantile regression estimator concerns the 
exogeneity assumption on the judicial efficacy measures. Both fixed-effects and quantile 
estimates can yield reasonably consistent parameter estimates if the judicial efficacy covariate 
is orthogonal to the error term in (3.1) and (3.2). But since the judicial efficacy is highly likely to 
be correlated with the unobservables, maintaining the exogeneity assumption is doubtful since 
the underlying fixed-effects coefficients of interest 
 
 1
cov ,ˆ
var
CR M
CR
   and 
 
 2
cov ,ˆ
var
CR M
CR
    are contaminated by omitted variable bias, particularly legal history. 
The omitted variable bias indicates that the judicial efficacy covariate is correlated with the 
unobservables,  cov , 0CR u   which implies that the fixed-effects coefficient on judicial 
efficacy does not reflect the causal effect on economic specialization.  
Our IV strategy exploits the historical variation in legal capital across Spanish provinces 
to consistently estimate the effect of judicial efficacy on economic specialization. Ignoring non-
linearities and potential interaction terms, we deploy the first-stage relationship for the 
jurisdiction-level congestion rate: 
     
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  (3.9) 
where 
Foral Law
1 , ,i j tZ  is the set of foral law IVs indicating whether the province is affected by foral 
law13, and e is the first-stage error term. We assume the set of proposed instruments based on 
legal history satisfies both the exogeneity and relevance restrictions. Each of the designated IVs 
contains part of the variation in judicial efficacy determined historically. Hence, we assume that 
the proposed set of IVs is orthogonal to the current economic specialization. It is quite unlikely 
that the proposed set of instruments would directly feed into the province-level differences in 
economic specialization. We impose the following covariance constraint:   Foral Law2 , , , ,cov , 0i j t i j tuZ . Under the covariance constraint, the underlying IV estimate yields 
                                                                          
13 As it was explained, different foral Law variables are designed depending on the jurisdiction. 
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a true underlying effect of interest since the probability limit of the IV estimator is the true effect of 
judicial efficacy on economic specialization: 
 
 
Foral Law
1 , , , ,
1 1 1Foral Law
1 , , , ,
cov ,
plim
cov ,
     
i j t i j tIV u
CRi j t i j t
u
CR
Z
Z
      (3.10) 
where our key identifying assumption is  Foral Law1 , , , ,cov , 0i j t i j tuZ  and which suggests that 
the underlying effect of judicial efficacy on economic specialization, exploited from foral legal 
background across provinces, appears to be consistent, 1 1plim
IV  . 
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4 Results 
Table 3 presents, the effects of judicial efficacy, proxied by jurisdiction-level congestion rates, 
on province-level economic specialization. The results proceed in two steps. In the first step, 
we simultaneously include time-varying and time-invariant covariates in the basic OLS 
specification. Please note that this effectively reduces the number of observations to 287 given 
the data limitations on time-invariant climatic and historical human capital variables. In the 
second step, we consider time-varying regressions only in fixed-effects and multi-way clustered 
specifications which keeps the number of observations at 800. 
4.1 Administrative Jurisdiction 
In Panel A, we first tackle the relationship between the congestion rate and the economic 
specialization across and within provinces at the level of administrative jurisdiction. The 
evidence suggests that provinces subject to greater congestion rates, hence having more 
inefficient judiciary, are substantially more likely to experience smaller manufacturing sectors 
and more expansive services’ sectors. Recalling Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), economic 
efficiency depends on the quality of property rights. A more efficient administrative jurisdiction 
would defend citizens and companies from potential “expropriation” (in the sense of potential 
favoritism of the government towards specific agents). Column (1), basic OLS evidence 
suggests a 1 percentage point increase in the administrative congestion rate is associated with 
0.7 percentage point drop in the size of the manufacturing sector relative to GDP. In column 
(3), the standard errors are simultaneously adjusted for spatial and temporal serially correlated 
stochastic disturbances that could potentially invoke omitted variable bias and mask the true 
effect either with upward and downward bias.  
The parameter estimate in column (3) advocates a quantitatively large effect of the 
judicial congestion rate on manufacturing activity both across and within provinces. In 
particular, 1 percentage point increase in the congestion rate is associated with 2.2 percentage 
point decline of the manufacturing sector. In column (9), the parameter estimates suggests that 
a higher congestion rate tends to encourage the specialization in the service sector. For each 
1 percentage point increase in the congestion rate, our model predicts 1.8 percentage point 
expansion of the services sector. In column (11), we adjust the OLS estimates for temporal and 
spatial serial correlation in the unobservables biasing the true effect. The parameter estimate 
from clustered standard errors advocate a quantitatively much larger effect on the size of 
services sector which is statistically significant at 1%. Neglecting the temporal and spatial 
clustering bias tends to underestimate the true effect of congestion rate on the services-based 
specialization by a factor of 1.28 which roughly equals 28 percent.  
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4.2 Labor Jurisdiction 
In Panel B, we closely examine the effects of judicial efficacy in the labor jurisdiction on 
province-level specialization patterns using the dismissal-related congestion rate as a proxy for 
judicial efficacy. The evidence advocates a strong and persistent relationship between the labor 
jurisdiction-level judicial efficacy and the patterns of economic specialization. In column (1), the 
OLS parameter estimate advocates an arguably large effect of congestion rate on province-
level specialization. For each 1 percentage point increase in province-level congestion rate, our 
model predicts 1.5 percentage points decrease in manufacturing/GDP ratio. Since the 
underlying relationship can be conditioned by the unobserved province-level heterogeneity 
hiding the true effect, we add the set of province-level fixed effects to the core empirical setup. 
The evidence suggests a much smaller but statistically significant effect of congestion rate on 
the patterns of specialization, which does not disappear with the parameter correction for 
spatial and temporal clustering bias. The province-level variation in the congestion rate across 
the labor jurisdiction explain a similar bulk of specialization differences to the congestion rate 
across the administrative jurisdiction from Panel A. Following the introduction, economic 
efficiency is related to the quality of the enforcement institutions that “control” the relationships 
between private agents and reduce the opportunism of contractors. This function is mostly 
carried out by the labor and the civil (which is discussed below) jurisdictions. Lower efficacy 
may affect sectoral composition. In column (3), a 1 percentage point increase in the labor 
congestion rate is associated with 4 percentage points decrease in the manufacturing activity 
relative to province-level GDP. In column (10), adding the province-fixed effects to the model 
setup suggests that greater congestion rate across the labor jurisdiction tends to favor the 
services sector. In particular, the point estimate predicts a 3 percentage point increase in the 
size of the services sector subsequent to a 1 percentage point increase in the congestion rate. 
Adjusting the standard errors for temporal and spatial clustering bias in the variance-covariance 
matrix in column (11) suggests the effect of labor-related congestion is noticeably larger (.056) 
than the unconstrained fixed-effect estimate (.030). From the normative perspective, the 
estimates plausibly indicate the adverse effects of judicial inefficacy on economic specialization. 
In particular, the provinces with inefficient judiciary will more likely abandon the productivity-
enhancing manufacturing activity, and will more likely concentrate in low-productivity service-
related activities. Moreover, our evidence suggests the judicial inefficacy might be able to 
partially account for the contrasting experience between highly industrialized north of Spain 
and heavily deindustrialized south. Although the established effect merely indicates the strength 
of the correlation between judicial (in)efficacy and patterns of economic specialization, it 
indicates that the magnitude of the effect does not disappear once the province-fixed effects 
are allowed, or once the parameter estimates are adjusted for spatial and temporal clustering 
bias hidden in the underestimated standard errors in the core setup. 
4.3 Civil Jurisdiction 
In Panel C, the effects of the congestion rate on province-level economic specialization are 
presented in depth for the civil jurisdiction. The evidence from columns (1) through (3) suggests 
that increasing congestion rate for civil cases is associated with a marked expansion of the 
manufacturing sector. In column (11), adjusting for temporal and spatial clustering bias 
suggests greater congestion rate in civil cases tends to produce a slight deindustrialization 
effect with a marked expansion in the size of the service sector following each percentage point 
increase in the congestion rate. 
4.4 Quantile Regression Estimates 
Does the effect of judicial efficacy on the level of industrialization differ across different levels of 
manufacturing/GDP and service/GDP ratios? The evidence so far suggests an unequivocal 
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effect of judicial efficacy on economic specialization at mean values of the outcome variables 
(at least for the administrative and the labor jurisdictions) which does not necessarily imply that 
established effects should hold across the entire distribution of outcome variables. Columns 
(4) through (8) and columns (12) through (16) disentangle the distributional effect of judicial 
efficacy on the size of the manufacturing sector and the services sector relative to GDP in more 
detail using the quantile regression approach. The evidence suggests that the effect of 
congestion rate per jurisdiction tends to differ persistently across different tails of the outcome 
distribution. In Panel A, increasing the congestion rate across the administrative jurisdiction 
tends to depress the size of the manufacturing sector strongly in the least industrialized 
provinces. The effect at the 10th percentile is much stronger than the baseline OLS effect with 
multiway-clustered standard errors, and statistically significant at 1%. The effect of 
administrative congestion rate tends to fade away at the 25th percentile. It becomes slightly 
stronger at the median but fades away at 75th and 90th percentiles, respectively. An opposite 
pattern is found in the quantile-specific relationship between the size of the service sector and 
the administrative congestion rate across columns (12) through (16). Increasing administrative-
level congestion rates tends to expand the size if the service sector consistently. The quantile 
effects are broadly comparable to the OLS effects with multiway-clustered standard errors. 
Therefore, the set of quantile-specific effects suggests that higher congestion rates tends to 
further amplify the deindustrialization process across provinces. In particular, higher congestion 
rates are substantially more likely to downscale the size of the manufacturing sector in the low-
manufacturing provinces, and further expand the size of the service sector in service-intensive 
provinces. 
In Panel B, we replicate the set of quantile regressions for the labor jurisdiction using 
the dismissal congestion rate as the key covariate of interest. The evidence unveils substantially 
stronger quantile-specific effects compared to the administrative-level congestion rate. 
Increasing congestion rate tends to strongly depress the size of the manufacturing sector at 
low manufacturing/GDP ratio, and the effect gradually becomes weaker in the upper 
percentiles. Nonetheless, magnitude of the OLS effect is matched with the quantile-specific 
effect at 75th and 90th percentile, respectively. From the distributional point of view, the 
disproportionate strength of the effect at 10th and 25th percentile readily suggests that greater 
judicial inefficacy is overwhelmingly more harmful to the least-industrialized provinces as it 
tends to further depress the manufacturing activity compared to the highly-industrialized 
provinces. An exactly opposite pattern is detected in columns (12) through (16) where a rising 
effect of congestion rates on the service/GDP ratio is found at higher quantiles of the outcome 
distribution. In particular, greater congestion rates tends to foster the service-intensive 
economic specialization to a much larger degree in high-service provinces compared to almost 
nonexistent effect in low-service provinces. Excluding the covariates, province-level differences 
in dismissals-related congestion rate account for between 1.7 percent and 1.9 percent of the 
overall differences in cross-province economic specialization at the median of the distribution. 
In Panel C, we replicate the core relationship across the five quantiles for the civil 
jurisdiction and find much smaller differences in the strength of the effect across various tails 
of the distribution. A quite even distribution of the effect is found across quantiles. In particular, 
our evidences advocates a rising congestion rate for civil cases tends to foster the service-
intensive specialization consistently across various tails of the distribution. On the other hand, 
rising congestion rate tends to dampen the size of the manufacturing sector, particularly at 10th 
and 25th percentile of the distribution. 
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Figure 6: Effect of Congestion Rate on Province-Level Manufacturing and Service GDP. 
Shares Across Micro-Percentiles 
(a) Effect of Congestion Rate in Administrative 
Jurisdiction on the Share  
of Manufacturing in GDP 
(b) Effect of Congestion Rate in Administrative 
Jurisdiction on the Share  
of Services in GDP 
  
(c) Effect of Judicial Congestion Rate 
 in Labor Jurisdiction on the Share  
of Manufacturing in GDP 
(d) Effect of Judicial Congestion Rate  
in Labor Jurisdiction on the Share of Services in 
GDP 
  
(e) Effect of Congestion Rate in Civil 
Jurisdiction (Cases) on the Share of 
Manufacturing in GDP 
(f) Effect of Congestion Rate in Civil 
Jurisdiction (Cases) on the Share of Services in 
GDP 
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In Figure 6, we break down the quantile estimates into micro-percentile estimates by 
narrowing the quantile estimator window down to 1/1000 of the original quantile estimation 
window to further unravel the heterogeneity in the distribution of the effect of congestion rate 
per jurisdiction on service/GDP and manufacturing/GDP ratio. The figure plots the estimated 
micro-percentile coefficients along with the 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal line 
denotes the OLS effect as a reference comparison. The evidence shows the effect of 
administrative-level congestion rate on manufacturing/GDP ratio does not elapse or move 
outside the negative space across a wide tail of the entire distribution. The effect of 
administrative-level congestion rate on the service/GDP ratio is stable and within the 95% 
confidence bounds across the whole spectrum of the outcome distribution which confirms its 
relevance in explaining the contrasting levels of industrialization across the provinces. In Panel 
(c) and (d), the percentile-based microsimulation suggests the effect of the dismissal-based 
congestion rate on the manufacturing activity is particularly strong in the lower part of the 
distribution and is gradually weakened at the higher end of the distribution while the effect of 
dismissal congestion rate on service/GDP ratio is stable across the whole spectrum of the 
outcome distribution. For the civil jurisdiction, micro-percentile effect simulation suggests an 
arguably strong and persistent effect of rising congestion rate on the size of the service/GDP 
ratio. 
4.5 Hausman-Taylor Estimates with Time-Invariant Controls 
In Table 4, we add the time-invariant covariates, i.e. historical literacy rates, temperature levels, 
precipitation, to the list of control variables and specifically distinguish between time-varying 
and time-invariant regressors. Using Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator based on the overall 
and within residual decomposition method, we estimate the core fixed-effects relationship with 
Hausman-Taylor random-effects estimator to prevent the potential time-invariant confounders 
from being eliminated by the within transformation in fixed-effects framework. The evidence 
confirms the negative effects of rising congestion rates on manufacturing activity across all 
three jurisdictions. At the same time, the evidence tends to substantiate the positive effect of 
rising congestion rates on service/GDP ratio. Columns (1) through (3) exhibit the effect of the 
congestion rate on manufacturing activity per jurisdiction. The parameter estimates suggest 
that the effect of the congestion rate on the manufacturing sector is most pervasive in the new 
civil and the labor jurisdictions and slightly weaker in terms of the magnitude in the 
administrative jurisdiction. Augmenting the baseline specification with time-invariant covariates 
arguably tends to bias the underlying judicial efficacy effect on the patterns of specialization. 
For time-invariant and time-varying regressors, we compute the test of joint significance and 
the evidence readily indicates the fundamental importance of time-varying regressors and time-
invariant controls in explaining the contrasting paths of economic specialization across 
provinces with p-value = 0.000 in each contested specification. 
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4.6 IV-Two Stage Estimates 
Our structural parameters are estimated using the Cameron et al. (2011) multiway clustering 
scheme at the province-, autonomous communities- and year level to address the multiple 
sources of temporal and spatial bias arising the serially correlated stochastic disturbances that 
might underestimate the standard errors and, consequently, over-reject the null hypothesis. In 
each specification, the F-test on excluded instrumental variables by Angrist and Pischke (2009), 
constructed by partialling out the linear projections of the endogenous variables predicted by 
instruments in the first stage, is consistently within 10% significance level suggesting that the null 
hypothesis of unidentified endogenous variables is rejected across the broad set of our model 
specifications. In addition, we subject the validity of our instruments to the test by Hansen (1982) 
with a null hypothesis that the exclusion restrictions are stable and, hence, the instrumental 
variables may be valid. Across the whole set of specifications, we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of overidentifying restrictions and conclude that the proposed instruments provide a plausibly 
exogenous source of variation in the differential paths of economic specialization across Spanish 
provinces. 
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In Table 5, we present the structural effects of judicial efficacy on economic 
specialization using the province-level presence of foral law as a plausibly exogenous source 
of variation in contemporary economic specialization.  
In each specification, we address the spatial and temporal bias in the dependence of 
serial correlation in unobservables across provinces, autonomous communities and over time 
simultaneously using the Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) multiway clustering scheme to 
adjust the standard errors thereof. Wherever feasible, we use the Nagar 2SLS maximum 
likelihood estimator (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993) to adjust the parameter estimates for the 
small-sample bias that might arise in our setup. We estimate the set of flexible panel-level 
specifications with a different fixed-effects setup by taking into account potential partial-out of 
structural covariates and first-stage IVs that could invoke the collinearity bias. In columns (1) 
through (6), we examine the effects of congestion rate on the shares of manufacturing and 
services in GDP at the level of administrative jurisdiction. 
In Panel B, first-stage evidence suggests an arguably powerful and persistent effect 
of foral law on contemporary province-level judicial efficacy. As indicated in columns (1) through 
(4) provinces affected by the foral law in the administrative jurisdiction, i.e. Basque Country and 
Navarra, tend to have between 13 percent, and 18 percent lower administrative congestion 
rate than the non-foral provinces. Across columns (1) through (4), the first-stage parameters 
suggest greater length of foral law compilation is associated with markedly lower congestion 
rates. The structural effects in Panel A confirm our theoretical notions. The point estimates 
imply that 1 percentage point increase in congestion rate decrease the share of manufacturing 
in province-level GDP between 3 percent and 4.8 percent, respectively. On the other hand, 1 
percentage point increase in administrative congestion rates tend to expand the service/GDP 
ratio between 2.8 percent and 5.6 percent, respectively. The full set of parameter estimates is 
statistically significant at 10% and 5%, respectively.   
The first-stage parameter estimates are statistically significant at 10% and 5% and 
unlikely to be confounded by the time-varying effects of per capita GDP, population size, 
density of lawyers and corporations per capita. In the second stage, rising congestion rate 
predicted by the IVs in the first stage, translate into an arguably large negative effect on the 
manufacturing activity. Accounting for the potential instrument bias, our evidence suggests that 
the overidentifying restrictions appear to be valid and unlikely to be confounded with the 
alternative sources of variation that could contaminate the structural relationship between 
judicial efficacy and economic specialization. We also consistently reject the null hypothesis on 
excluded instruments in the first-stage which confirms the relevance of foral law in explaining 
the between-province differences in judicial efficacy.  
In particular, our two-stage model setup predicts a discernable drop in the province-
level manufacturing/GDP ratio with rising congestion rate. Concurrent to columns (1) and (2), 
in columns (3) and (4) a positive effect of rising congestion rate on the service/GDP ratio is 
found. Apart from demonstrating a strong downward bias in baseline OLS estimates, the 
evidence from the IV-2 stage setup readily suggests that rising congestion rates translate into 
sectoral shifts from manufacturing towards service-based economic activity. 
Please note that we omit the labor jurisdiction from the IV-2 stage estimation setup 
since the labor jurisdiction is not subject to foral law. In columns (5) through (8), we replicate 
our structural and first-stage estimates using the province-level variation in congestion rates 
across the civil jurisdiction. The first-stage evidence testifies to the ubiquitous importance of 
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foral law in explaining the differential congestion rates across the civil jurisdiction down to 
the present day. In column (9), the point estimates suggest the provinces with historical 
experience in the foral law have, on average, 14.5 percent lower congestion rate for civil 
cases. In the second stage (Panel A), rising the congestion rate in the civil jurisdiction predicts 
a sharp drop in the manufacturing/GDP ratio, and a marked rise in the share of services in 
province-level GDP. 
When we restrict the composition of foral law quasi-treatment group to Catalonia only 
in columns (6) and (8), the evidence suggests a remarkably strong effect of congestion rate on 
the pattern of economic specialization. In particular, 10 percent increase in the civil congestion 
rate is associated with 0.6 percentage point drop in the manufacturing/GDP ratio, and 0.5 
percentage point expansion in the service/GDP ratio, respectively. Both parameter estimates 
are statistically significant at 1%, and are unlikely to suffer from weak identification properties 
with asymptotically stable exclusion restrictions, and relatively strong first-stage evidence on 
the relevance of foral law IVs in explain the judicial efficacy down to the present day. When the 
foral law quasi-treatment group comprises Catalan and non-Catalan provinces, the structural 
effects still hold although the underlying effects appear to be slightly weaker with respect to the 
service/GDP ratio, and slightly stronger with respect to manufacturing/GDP ratio compared the 
parametric estimates in columns (6) and (8). Both structural IV effects are quantitatively larger 
than the OLS counterparts, which suggests a persistent downward omitted variable bias in the 
causal inference on OLS coefficients. Hence, the evidence suggests that the effect of 
congestion rates on cross-province economic specialization is likely to be causal which 
confirms our theoretical expectations. 
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4.7 Counterfactual Scenario 
The ultimate question regarding the contribution of judicial efficacy to the economic 
specialization pattern concerns the counterfactual scenario. Would the province-level share of 
services and manufacturing be different from current ones if high-congestion provinces had 
low congestion rates across different layers of jurisdiction? The results presented so far 
highlight the fundamental importance of judicial efficacy for the patterns of economic 
specialization. Specifically, our evidence suggests that high-congestion provinces across 
administrative, labor and civil jurisdiction are significantly more likely to undergo service-
intensive specialization while low-congestion provinces are substantially more likely to 
experience higher share of manufacturing in the province-level GDP. 
Our counterfactual scenario consists of several steps. In the first step, we compute 
the baseline province-level longitudinal point estimates from (3.1) and (3.2) in the absence of 
time-invariant covariates to overcome the time variance singularity conditions for each 
jurisdictional layer. In the second step, we specify the counterfactual threshold for high-
congestion provinces. Considering the key parameters from the descriptive statistics, our 
counterfactual scenario is based on the shift of congestion rates from the 75th percentile to the 
25th percentile. Such a scenario effectively restricts the composition of the treatment group to 
those provinces which tend to experience above-75th percentile congestion rate per 
jurisdiction. And lastly, in the third step, we use the point estimates on congestion rates and 
the full set of control variables to predict the conditional manufacturing and service shares in 
high-congestion provinces if they had congestion rate at 25th percentile from the onset of the 
estimation period. Across the full set of province-level model specifications, we use Cameron 
et al. (2011) multiway clustering estimator with province-, region (autonomous community), and 
year-fixed effects to allow for serially correlated stochastic disturbances and arbitrary 
heteroskedastic distribution of error variance which might jeopardize the consistency of our key 
parameters. 
Figure 7 presents the counterfactual scenario for the treated provinces per each 
jurisdiction.14 The evidence readily suggests that pushing the congestion rate from the 75th 
percentile to the 25th percentile of the cross-province distribution is associated with marked 
changes in economic specialization. In particular, we observe a notable gain in the share of 
manufacturing and an important drop in the share of services or, at the least, a substantially 
slower rise in the size of the service sector. For the administrative jurisdiction, a drop in 
congestion rate to the 25th percentile threshold is associated with markedly lower share of 
services, particularly for the provinces hypothetically most affected by the drop in the 
congestion rate, namely Málaga, Almería, Lleida and Huelva. At the same time, we observe a 
notable rise in the manufacturing/GDP ratio following a drop in the congestion rate to the 25th 
percentile, particularly for the provinces of Almería, León, Malaga and Toledo which appear to 
be characterized by a low degree of judicial efficacy in the administrative jurisdiction. 
Similar gains in the manufacturing/GDP ratio and drops in service/GDP ratio are 
observed in the labor jurisdiction. In particular, the counterfactual scenario suggests a marked 
decline in service/GDP ratio in the provinces Málaga, Murcia and Valencia and a moderate drop 
in the provinces of Zamora and Lleida. In addition, the counterfactual scenario highlights gains 
in the share of manufacturing in GDP for the quasi-treated provinces. Across the balance, the 
counterfactual estimates imply that reducing the congestion rate in the labor jurisdiction from 
                                                                          
14 Treatment group comprises the provinces whose mean congestion rate throughout the estimation period exceeds 
the 75th percentile of the cross-province distribution. 
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75th to 25th percentile threshold is associated with marked and discernable gains in the size of 
the manufacturing sector. Panel (c) exhibit the counterfactual scenario for the new civil 
jurisdiction. Since the treatment pool in the new civil jurisdiction is noticeably larger compared 
to the other two jurisdictions, the counterfactual scenario is characterized by greater 
heterogeneity of the estimates. In line with our expectations, the estimates readily advocate a 
notable gain in the manufacturing/GDP ratio and a markedly slower rise in service/GDP ratio 
following the drop in the congestion rate to the 25th percentile of the full-sample distribution. In 
Appendix B, we present the counterfactual estimates for both outcome variables broken down 
by the respective jurisdiction. 
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Figure 7: Summary of Counterfactual Scenario 
(a) Administrative Jurisdiction 
Log Share of Manufacturing Log Share of Services 
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(c) Civil Jurisdiction 
Log Share of Manufacturing Log Share of Services 
  
 
4.8 Robustness Checks 
The main caveat arising from our results concerns the choice of the dependent variables as the 
appropriate measures of economic specialization. Although the effects of judicial efficacy on the 
type of economic specialization confirm its negative impact on manufacturing activity and the 
positive impact on service-related economic activities, it is quite likely that other sectors of 
economic activity may be adversely affected by the local-level judicial efficacy. To this end, we 
use two alternative measures of economic specialization and replicate our core structural and 
non-structural model setup to tackle the robustness of our estimates against alternative proxies 
for economic specialization. Our alternative measure of economic specialization is denoted on 
the nexus between complex and non-complex economic activities (Hidalgo and Hausmann 2009, 
Hausmann and Hidalgo 2011). By the standard account, complex economic activities involve 
long-term relationships, require long-term investments, and are heavily reliant on judicial efficacy 
to solve the disputes efficiently. In contrast, non-complex economic activities involve relatively 
simple contractual relationships where short-term commitment prevails over the long-term one. 
Hence, local judicial efficacy should play an important role in influencing the specialization in 
complex vs. non-complex economic activities. 
We compute two province-level building blocks of economic specialization. The first 
building block captures complex economic activities. This building block comprises the share 
of manufacturing in GDP as the most obvious type of economic activity involving complex long-
term relationships.15 By the same reasoning, the second building block captures non-complex 
economic activities based on short-term relationships and substantially less long-term 
                                                                          
15 Despite some conceptual similarity with the manufacturing sector, we exclude the energy sector from the building 
block of complex activities. The underlying rationale is that energy investment are contingent on many factors 
unrelated to the local judicial efficacy such as the structure of feed-in tariffs, geographic endowments, and 
proximity to external suppliers outside the home country among many other factors. Such factors do not comprise 
our core hypothesis on the adverse effects of judicial efficacy on economic specialization. The energy sector is 
oversight by the National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC). 
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commitment. This building block comprises the combined share of construction, agriculture 
and service activities from the INE Database.16 
In the Appendix C, we present the OLS and IV evidence on the effects of judicial 
efficacy on complex vs. non-complex economic specialization. The evidence confirms our key 
theoretical notion. The provinces with more efficient judiciary are significantly more likely to 
specialize in complex economic activities while the provinces with more inefficient judiciary are 
substantially more likely to specialize in non-complex activities around the nexus of services, 
agriculture and construction. The effects hold across the administrative, labor, and civil 
jurisdictions. Table C1 replicates the core OLS and quantile setup on the relationship between 
economic specialization and judicial efficacy. In our preferred specifications with multi-way 
clustered standard errors, 1 percentage point increase in the administrative congestion rate 
tends to decrease the share of complex economic activities in the province-level GDP by 0.2 
percentage points. The underlying effects appear to be noticeably stronger for the civil 
jurisdiction where a 1 percentage point increase in the congestion rate tends to backlash the 
share of complex activities by 0.4 percentage points within 5% significance bound. Provinces 
with more inefficient judiciary are significantly more likely to specialize in non-complex economic 
activities. In particular, 1 percentage point rise in the administrative congestion rate tends to 
expand the share of non-complex activities in the GDP by 0.2 percentage points. In the civil 
and labor jurisdictions, 1 percentage point increase in the congestion rates tends to enlarge 
the share of non-complex economic activities in the province-level GDP by 0.5 percentage 
points and 0.6 percentage points, respectively. Breaking down the effects by quantiles unveils 
a pattern similar to the core setup in Table 3. The evidence also suggests that our results are 
robust against the choice of dependent variables as alternative measures of economic 
specialization involving sectors other than manufacturing and services. 
In Table C2, we replicate the core IV-2SLS structural setup with the complex and non-
complex specialization outcome variables. The results confirm our expectations. Rising 
congestion rates are associated with a persistent drop in the share of complex economic 
activities relative to the size of GDP while provinces with lower judicial efficacy tend to have a 
larger share of non-complex economic activities. In the first stage, we use the foral law IVs to 
isolate the impact of judicial efficacy on province-level economic specialization. In the second 
stage, we use the predicted congestion rates to explain the specialization outcomes across 
provinces. In the first stage, the provinces affected by the foral law tend to have markedly 
different judicial efficacy compared to non-foral law provinces. In the second stage, rising 
congestion rates tend to dampen the share of complex economic activities persistently.17 The 
effects are especially profound in the administrative jurisdiction. Based on the evidence in 
columns (1) and (2), 1 percentage point increase in the administrative-level congestion rate is 
associated with a decrease in the share of complex economic activities in the GDP between 
0.1 and 0.2 percentage points. The equivalent 1 percentage point increase in the administrative 
congestion rate tends to expand the share of non-complex activities in the GDP between 0.02 
and 0.7 percentage points. The estimated parameters are statistically significant within 
conventional 1% or 5% bounds. 
                                                                          
16 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Contabilidad Regional de España, Base 2010: 
     http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/cre00/b2010/homog/dacocre_base2010h.htm  
17 Since there is no foral Law in the labor jurisdiction, we report the basic OLS estimates with province/autonomous 
community/year-clustered standard errors in the presence of structural confounding variables simultaneously 
influencing province-level economic specialization. 
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In the civil jurisdiction, the IV-estimated effects of judicial efficacy on broad-based 
economic specialization are particularly strong and pervasive across the full set of 
specifications. In the presence of unobserved technology shocks common to all provinces, 1 
percentage point increase in the congestion rate in the civil jurisdiction tends to decrease the 
share of complex activities in the province-level GDP by 0.6 percentage points. In column (8), 
we replace time-fixed effects with the structural confounders and find that the judicial efficacy 
coefficient remains stable. On the other hand, a higher congestion rate in the civil jurisdiction 
tends to expand the share of non-complex economic activities in the GDP between 0.09 and 
0.1 percentage points and remains stable across the full set of estimated specifications. Hence, 
the evidence suggests that our estimates are robust against alternative measures of province-
level economic specialization. 
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5 Conclusions 
Sectoral specialization may be reactive to the quality of enforcement institutions. Sectors more 
dependent on specific investments (such as manufacturing) may be more reliant on high quality 
judicial systems to operate. In this paper, we examine the effects of judicial (in)efficacy on 
economic specialization across Spanish provinces for the period 1999-2014. To this end, we 
exploit the variation in foral Law to identify the effect of judicial efficacy on the paths of economic 
specialization across and within Spanish provinces. We construct provincial congestion rates 
as broad measures of judicial inefficacy for the administrative, labor and civil jurisdictions. The 
province-level congestion rates are matched with the weights of the sectors constructed from 
output data for every year in our sample. Controlling for the confounding effects of enterprise 
density, income level and lawyers per capita, our estimation strategy consists of two stages. In 
the first stage, we exploit the variation in the foral law to predict the contemporary congestion 
rates. In the second stage, we use the predicted congestion rates to explain the differential 
levels of industrialization and services across and within Spanish provinces. 
Our results suggest that greater judicial inefficacy, captured by the rising congestion 
rates, under the common legal system tends to encourage the deindustrialization process. 
Provinces with above-median or rising congestion rates are significantly more likely to embark 
on the path of deindustrialization than the provinces with low, stable and below-median 
congestion rates. Higher congestion rates typically lead to the decreasing manufacturing/GDP 
ratio and rising service/GDP ratio simultaneously and therefore encourage a pattern of 
economic specialization related to slow productivity growth. The effect of judicial inefficacy on 
economic specialization is not created equal across all three jurisdictions. The effect does not 
appear to be confounded by income level, number of lawyers per capita or by enterprise 
density. The three jurisdictions seem relevant to explain specialization, although the 
administrative jurisdiction appears to have a more pronounced impact than the labor or civil 
jurisdictions. 
From the normative point of view, our results suggest that the effect of foral Law on 
judicial efficacy is strongly persistent down to the present day, and does not seem to be 
substituted by alternative explanations or unobservables. Most likely, greater judicial inefficacy 
at the administrative level tends to bias the strength of the property rights against the long-term 
investments, adding further uncertainty to the investment decisions. Such uncertainty clearly 
hinders long-term investments in the manufacturing sector where long-term relationships are 
one of the key investment prerequisites. We find a similar but less pronounced effect for the 
rising congestion rate in the civil jurisdiction. In addition, greater judicial inefficacy in the labor 
jurisdiction (which is not affected by foral Law) is most likely to push up both firm-level and 
province-level transaction costs. Our results predict quantitatively large and statistically 
significant decrease in the manufacturing/GDP ratio and a notable expansion of the share of 
services in total output as an outcome of rising congestion rates across the labor jurisdiction.  
In the counterfactual scenario, having shifting the jurisdiction-level congestion rate 
from the 75th percentile to 25th percentile of the distribution is associated with marked gains in 
the share of industry in the GDP while the share of services tends to decline persistently in the 
treated provinces. The counterfactual estimates are particularly powerful in the civil and 
administrative jurisdictions. Hence, judicial inefficacy might play an important role in shaping 
the patterns of economic specialization and might help us partially explain why some provinces, 
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predominantly in the south of Spain, are trapped by low levels of industrialization, widespread 
service-intensive economic activities and slow productivity, and why some provinces, mostly 
in the north of Spain (Basque Country, Navarre, Aragon) have higher levels of industrialization 
and better productivity performance. The effects of judicial efficacy, as one of the key layers of 
the institutional matrix, on economic specialization seems definitely worth to be taken into 
account. 
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Appendix A: The Effect of the History of Legal Education on Judicial Efficacy 
This appendix adds to the “foral Law” IVs proposed in section 2.3 a second group of IVs which 
compiles information on the historical conditions and structure of the Spanish university 
system. 
Lawyers are educated in Law schools, which have a specific size, location and history. 
Lawyers (and, potentially, Law faculties) may be related to litigation. The relationship, however, 
is not always significant nor endogenous (see Mora-Sanguinetti and Garoupa, 2015). The 
relationship is positive in the case of the U.S. (Hanssen, 1999), Japan (Ginsburg and Hoetker, 
2006), Italy [Carmignani and Giacomelli (2010), Buonanno and Galizzi (2012)] and Spain (Mora-
Sanguinetti and Garoupa, 2015). No relationship was found for Austria or in the US (in an 
alternative study). This debate may matter because it is well established that excessive litigation 
leads to longer resolution periods in a judicial system (Palumbo et al., 2013) and lawyers are 
the professionals who channel conflicts inside the judicial system. In parallel, it may be argued 
that, despite a potential positive relationship between lawyers and litigation (which collapses 
the judicial system and should lead to higher congestion18), better legal education should lead 
to the emergence of better enforcement institutions. For all this, the historical characteristics of 
Law education in Spain seems relevant as an instrument. 
In 1845, Spain had 10 universities (Santiago, Oviedo, Zaragoza, Barcelona, Valladolid, 
Salamanca, Madrid, Valencia, Granada and Seville). Those cities were also capitals of their 
respective “university districts”. In each of these universities there was a Law School. The 
students of the respective districts had to study in the corresponding university. In this way, a 
student from Malaga, had to go to the University of Granada (but he could not go to Seville or 
Madrid) and a student from the Balearic Islands had to go to the University of Barcelona.  
First of all, we have computed the “size” of the Law departments by 1845 as a 
potential measure of intellectual leadership. Therefore, we have created variables reporting the 
number of Law professors in each of the old 10 universities and the number of the total number 
of professors in each of them. From Mora-Sanguinetti and Garoupa (2015) we have obtained 
the distance (in kilometers from the capital of the 1845 university district to other provinces of 
the district) and the number of active law schools by 1968. We have taken 1968 as a cutoff 
date since it is the date of creation of the last “classic” Law school in Spain (the University of 
the Basque Country in Guipúzcoa). Afterwards, the UNED (National Distance Education 
University), was created in 1972 and served all provinces at the same time potentially distorting 
the results. 
This appendix proposes an alternative IV strategy (to that presented in Section 3.3) 
which exploits both the presence of foral Law and the history of legal education across Spanish 
provinces. Following the structure already presented in Section 3.3., the first-stage relationship 
for the jurisdiction-level congestion rate can be expressed as: 
                                                                          
18 Which could be considered a proxy of the trial length. 
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where 
Law Faculty in 1968
1Z  is a dummy variable indicating an active law faculty in 1968, 
Foral Law
2Z  indicates whether the province is affected by foral law (as in Section 3.3.), 
Distance to Law School
3Z  denotes the distance from the nearest law school, and 
Law Professors in 1845
4Z  denotes the number of law professors in 1845, 
Total Professors in 1845
5Z  
denotes the number of total professors in 1845, and e is the first-stage error term.  
In parallel with the discussion in Section 3.3., we impose the following set of covariance 
constraints,  Law Faculty in 19681 , , , ,cov , 0i j t i j tZ u  ,  Distance to Law School3 , , , ,cov , 0i j t i j tZ u  , 
 Law Professors in 18454 , , , ,cov , 0i j t i j tZ u  , and  Total Professors in 18455 , , , ,cov , 0i j t i j tZ u  
In Table B1, we present the structural effects of judicial efficacy on economic 
specialization using the province-level history of legal education and the presence of foral law 
as a plausibly exogenous source of variation in contemporary economic specialization. 
Provinces with a greater density of law faculties in 1968 tend to have significantly and 
discernably lower rates of congestion in the civil jurisdiction. The provinces with a greater 
historical density of law professors in 1845 tend to have substantially lower rates of congestion. 
Although the effect is very small, the distance to the Law school district seems to increase 
congestion. In summary, even though there is evidence for a positive relationship (although the 
relationship does not seem to be endogenous) between lawyers and litigion for the case of 
Spain (Mora-Sanguinetti and Garoupa, 2015), under this setup and period of analysis, the 
impact of stronger or nearer historical Law education institutions seem to have a positive impact 
on the quality of enforcement institutions (measured through the congestion rate). Finally, a 
higher density of professors (in general, thus proxying the size of the university) seems to be 
related in one of our specifications for the labor jurisdiction to higher congestion rates. Table 
B1 presents the underlying effects in greater detail. 
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Appendix B: Counterfactual Scenario 
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Appendix C: The Impact of Judicial Efficacy on Economic Specialization Using Alternative Outcome Variables. 
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